While there has been considerable research on the disincentive effects of cash welfare under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, there is little evidence on the benefits of the program for single mothers and their children. One potential benefit of this program is that it provides short-run consumption insurance for women at the point that they become single mothers. This is only true, however, to the extent that the program is not crowding out other sources of support, such as own savings, labor supply, or transfers from others. I assess the importance of this insurance mechanism by measuring the extent to which AFDC smooths the consumption of women who transition to single motherhood.
extensive empirical testing and criticism, there is very little evidence to support or refute the benefits that this program has in terms of raising the standard of living of recipients.
It is impossible to know what types of institutions might emerge to support single mothers and their children in the absenu of any cash welfare system, so that one cannot estimate the effect of eliminating AFDC on the standard of living of this Population.z In this paper, I pursue a more modest goal: to explore the role of the existing cash welfare system as a consumption smoothing devim for women at the point that they become single mothers.
Divorce or out-of-wedlock childbearing is potentially associated with a large reduction in the standard of living of these women and their families. One goal of the welfare system, as with other social insurance programs such as unemployment insuranw, is to insure family income against this adverse event.3 To the extent that AFDC provides such insurance, it represents a benefit of the program which must be weighed against any distortions that arise from the structure of this means-tested categorical transfer.
I assess the extent to which AFDC provides this insurance by exploiting the tremendous variation in the generosity of this program across states, and within states over time. If cash welfare is playing such a consumption smoothing role, there should be corresponding variation in the consumption change for those becoming stigle mothers in different states and times. That is, to the extent that AFDC is not simply crowding out other sources of support, then increases in benefit @ne potential empirical strategy for answering this question would be to use historical evidence on insurance arrangements before the growth of the AFDC program. For example, Olasky (1992) argues that private charity provided an effective safety net for the indigent before the emergen~of the New Deal. But, even to the extent that this is true, underlying changes in the nature of the economy and private insurance mechanisms over the subsequent years make it difficult to extend this conclusion m the removal of the current social safety net.
3At the same time, of course, critics claim that cash welfare is causing these transitions to single motherhood; I address this important point at length below. For a related argument and evidence for the unemployment insurance system, see Gruber (forthcoming) . This longitudinal survey allows one to follow women as they move between marital and childbearing states. I use two different measures of consumption that are available in the PSID: food expenditures and housing expenditures. The PSID data are matched to information about the welfare system in each state over tie [1968] [1969] [1970] [1971] [1972] [1973] [1974] [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] period to estimate the basic consumption smoothing relationship.
To summarize, I find that the transition to single motherhood is associated with only a small 3% reduction in food and housing expenditures on average. However, this small reduction is due to the important assumption smoothing role played by AFDC. For the full sample, each dollar of
AFDC~li~ib~mitigates the consumption fall associated with single motherhood by 30 cents. That is, the reduction in consumption from this adverse event would be over seven times as large if AFDC
were not available. I also find that for mothers is associated with (at most) a 95 each dollar of AFDC received by those becoming single cent rise in consumption of food and housing. This result suggests that there is not a significant crowdout of other sources of support by the AFDC system. This mnsumption smoothing effect operates for both women who become divor~and those single women who have children, although the effect is larger on the former group, primarily through the effect of AFDC on housing expenditures.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Part I, I provide background on the welfare system and related research, and a simple model to illustrate the potential for AFDC to serve as a consumption smoothing mechanism. Part II describes the data, and Part III discusses the empirical strategy. Part IV then presents the basic PSID regression results, and pursues a number of specification checks and extensions. Part V concludes. House of Representatives, 1993) . Thus, for the purposes of this analysis I will treat AFDC eligibility as being restricted to single mothers.
4The SS1 program, which provides benefits to the poor disabled and elderly, is of roughly the same magnitude as the AFDC program. Additional cash welfare is provided by some state General Assistance programs. I will only focus on cash welfare through AFDC in this paper, although when I measure welfare income receipt in the PSID I will include all welfare income, since the distinction in the survey between AFDC and other welfare may not be a clear one.
'Alaska is an outlier in terms of positive benefit growth; for the next highest state, growth was 258% (Maine). Even using this figure, the disparity in benefit growth is substantial, with a 10-fold difference in growth rates across states.
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There is an enormous literature which has focused on the effects of cash welfare on behavior; see Moffitt (1992) for a comprehensive review. There are two common features to almost all previous research in this area. First, the identification strategy generally relies on variation in the generosity of cash welfare across states and time. Second, in almost every case the focus of the research has been on the~isinwntive effec~of AFDC. All of tie articles reviewed by Moffitt focus on the potentially deleterious effects of the AFDC program for labor supply, marital status, childbearing, long term welfare dependence, or migration. But there is little work on the benefits of the program for the targeted group, single mothers.
There is a large body of older research which attempts to assess the adequacy of AFDC, in terms of raising recipients out of poverty; see Danziger et al. (1981) for a review. But, as Danziger et al. emphasize, this literature has all been static; that is, none of these studies have allowed for any offsetting income flows in response to increases in AFDC generosi~.
To the extent that any offsetting behavioral responses to the program exist, these calculations overstate the effects of AFDC on the standard of living of single mothers, But there has been little attempt to incorporate these responses in measuring the extent to which increases in AFDC generosity translate to an improved standard of living.
In theory, the adequacy of AFDC could be assessed by using eviden~from these previous studies on how other sources of support for single mothers are reduced, or crowded out, when welfare becomes more generous. But the list of potential sources of support is a very long one, and here is only evidence on some of these margins. For example, there is some evidence that changes in the AFDC guaran& reduce labor supply (see the evidence reviewed in Danziger et al., 1981 ) .6 bMoffht (1986) provides more recent evidence, and the results are mixed once state fixed effects are included in the model. But the evidence on the crowdout effect on transfers from others is mixed,' and there is no work on the response of savings behavior. a
In addition, there is substantial anecdotal and personal interview evidence that AFDC recipients are maintaining their living standards by relying on legal and illegal income sources that are not reported to the -C c~worker and presumably not reported to the (PSID or other) survey interviewer either (Edin, 1995) . But no previous research has assessed how these unreported sources of income respond to AFDC generosity changes, and it is difficult to imagine doing so giving the inherent data problems. Finally, there is no work on how these different margins interact; the response of private transfers to AFDC generosi~may be a function of how labor supply responds, for example. Thus, an alternative approach must be used to answer this question. The approach proposed in this paper is to directly examine how AFDC generosity differences are translated into changes in the standard of living for women who transition to single motherhood.
A Model
In order to lay out the nature of the expected relationship between AFDC and consumption changes, it is useful to write down a simple model of the consumption implications of the transition to single motherhood. The unit of observation, which I label the "welfare unit", is a woman and her (zero or more) children, who faces some risk of becoming a single mother either through divorce (in the case where she is married, and there are some children already present), or through 'Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1994) find only a small crowdout effect of AFDC on parental mntributions to young women. Cox and Jacubson (1995) find a crowdout of the probability of receiving support, but not the amount of support. Scheoni (1994) finds a larger crowdout for blacks.
* Powers (1996) does find that asset limits under the AFDC program appear to affect asset accumulation levels, but she does not explore the role of benefits variation.
childbearing (in the case where she is unmarried, and there are not yet children present). In the first period of the model, the welfare unit has earned income of y available with which to finance the mnsumption of the women and her children.g The woman can also set aside some of this inmme, s, for savings, either in the form of financial assets or loans to others that can be drawn down at some later date.'0 She faces a risk of (1-a) of becoming a single mother in period 2; this is assumed to be exogenous, a point to which I return in the empirical work. If she becomes a single mother, the net income of the welfare unit falls to ky, where Oc k < 1; this is either because the husband leaves (in the case of dissolution), or because the woman either cannot work or must hire child care ("m the case of child-bearing).
On the other hand, in this case the woman has three additional resources with which to finance mnsumption: her own savings (s), AFDC payments (A), or transfers from others (t). Transfers from others are gifts, wnsisting of some lump sum amount, and also (potentially) of some amount which is a general function of her net income in the single mother state:
(1) t =T+f(ky+A)
Following the details of the current AFDC minus a 100% tax rate on other income.
program, benefits are the maximum AFDC payment@ However, I assume that transfers from others are not reported to the AFDC authorities; nor do the authorities measure the "savings" that the woman has me amount y can be viewed as the outcome of a within-family bargaining process which yields some division of mnsumption between the welfare unit and other household members. An important limitation of the PSID data in practice is that I only obseme total family consumption in the data and not the consumption of the welfare unit alone; I discuss this issue in more detail below.
'°For example, groups of women who face a high risk of single motherhood may make loans to their friends when they become single mothers. These are different than the transfers modelled below, which are not "balanced budget" but are simply gifis to the single mother. where utility is of the log form, and where previous income is normalized to one. The results of this exercise are depicted in Figure 1 . The AFDC maximum payment is displayed along the x axis, and the change in consumption is measured on they axis. I mnsider the case where a =0.95 (5 percent chance of becoming a single mother), and k =0 (no earned income for the welfare unit after the transition to single motherhood), for four different scenarios: transfers which are a lump sum set to be 20% of predissolution income, but which are not a finction of AFDC benefits, and no savings; savings with lump sum transfers; savings, and transfers which offset one-half of net AFDC payments; savings, and transfers which exactly offset AFDC payments.
In the fust case, with no savings and no transfers, there is a one-for-one consumption smoothing rok of AFDC; that is, since there is no souru of private insuranw, each dollar of public insurance is translated directly to consumption. In fact, in this case, if AFDC replaces more than 80% of pre-dissolution income there is an increase in consumption due to the fixed transfer. In each 1lThis is consistent with the evidence in Ed in (1995) . Making transfers "taxable" by the AFDC system would not qualitatively change the conclusions of the model. Similarly, I do not condition transfers on the mother's savings; this does not change the qualitative conclusions, since these are two different margins of crowdout.
of the other cases, however, the savings, but excluding transfers, mnsumption mitigates the 9 smoothing effect of AFDC is smaller. Introducing consumption smoothing role of AFDC substantially for low AF'DC benefits, since there is negative infinite utility h zero consumption; as AFDC benefits rise, savings crowds out a smaller share of benefits, sinu the marginal utility of consumption in the second period is sufficiently high. Introducing transfers further increases the crowd out of AFDC (and of savings); in the limit, with fully offsetting transfers, there is no consumption smoothing effect.
Thus, only "in the limiting case of no savings and no transfers from others will increases in AFDC benefits be directly translated to consumption; in other cases, some of the benefit increase will crowd out private insurance mechanisms. The ultimate extent of consumption smoothing is an empirical question.~is model suggests tie empirical formulation of that question as a regression of the Chmge in consumption upon single motherhood on the amount of AFDC benefits available; this is me approach that I pursue below.
Retied Work
There are two previous papers that directly assess the welfare gains from increases in AFDC generosity. Currie and Cole (1993) examine the effect of changes in AFDC generosity on the health of infants born to AFDC recipients; they find no correlation between AFDC payment levels and infant health. " A previous attempt to measure the consumption effects of AFDC is Pollack (1994) .
He also uses the PSID data to model the consumption of AFDC recipients as a function of state/year AFDC generosity, for the 1981-1987 period. He finds that a 10% increase in program generosity raises the food consumption of AFDC recipients by roughly 7%. This is a suggestive finding, but his approach suffers from three problems. First, while empirical estimates of most behavioral effects of AFDC are in general inconclusive, the one response which has been documented most clearly is that AFDC participation does respond to AFDC generosity (see the evidence reviewed in Moffitt, 1992 ; also Moffitt, 1986) . This leads to a potential sample selection bias in the estimates, if the women who select into this sample as AFDC bemmes more generous have differential consumption patterns. Second, an important consideration in this type of regression is the fact that AFDC benefit changes are potentially correlated with state-level changes in the cost of living over time, and thus with consumption expenditures. This is not surmounted by the inclusion of state effects of even individual fixed effects, since there may be low frequency movements in prices within areas which drive both consumption expenditures and AFDC benefits over time. Finally, one problem with using PSID data for this type of analysis in the past has been the fact that subfamilies (in which roughly 1/2 of single mothers reside) have not been identified in the data; I present an approach to surmounting this problem below.
Part II: Data
The primary data set for this analysis is the PSID. This longitudinal survey has been carried out continuously since 1968, following the same sample of families and their "split-offs" over time.
The original sample consisted of a nationally representative cross-section and a sub-sample of families in poverty; in the analysis below I use both samples in order to increase the precision of the estimates.
The PSID is the only multi-year longitudinal data set available with information on consumption behavior. Each year, respondents are asked how much their family "usually" spends on food at home and food away from home, as well as the amount of food paid for by food stamps. -They are also asked about expenditures on rent and mortgage payments.'2 I deflate each component of consumption by the CPI for that mmponent in the month of the interview, and then sum the real components (including food stamps). I also exclude observations where any element of mnsumption is imputed, rather than reported directly by the respondent. It is unfortunate that broader consumption aggregates are not available in the PSID, forcing me to limit myself to food and housing expenditures. These are, however, the types of necessary expenditures that are of most interest for those ancemed about the well-being of single mothers and their families. 13
There are at least three potentially important data issues with using the PSID sample. The first is timing. The rent and mortgage questions clearly refer to the point of the PSID interview.
Although the frame of reference for the fwd consumption measures is not entirely clear, Zeldes (1989) convincingly argues that it refers to the point of the interview (rather than the previous year). '4 This timing matches the information on family structure, which is recorded at the point if the interview as well. However, it does not match the information on welfare receipt, which is from the previous calendar year. This will introduce measurement error in a regression of mnsumption on welfare income, a problem to which I return below.
12Food consumption data are missing for 1973; mortgage payment data are missing for [1973] [1974] [1975] . But I am able to use some data for 1974 and 1975 by noting that mortgage payments are zero for renters. The PSID also gathers information on expenditures on utilities, but these data are missing for several additional years so I did not use them in the analysis. 131have attempted to replicate this analysis using the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CE~, which provides information on all consumption expenditures for the 1980 to 1993 period. Unfortunately, there were sufficiently few transitions to single motherhood (roughly 220) in those data that I was unable to estimate the response to AFDC with any precision. For those transitions, food and housing" expenditures were roughly 40% of total non-durable expenditures in the period preceding single motherhood.
"0ne exception is food expenditures paid for using food stamps. using average food stamp expenditure last year; from 1977 onwards, month of the survey is used.
Before 1977, this is measured food stamp expenditure in the Semnd, an important limitation of the PSID for this type of analysis is the difficulty in identifying relationships among sample members. The data set identifies clearly the household in which each sample member lives, as well as their relationship to the household head. It also identifies subfamilies that moved into existing PSID households.
Thus, for nuclear households (father, mother, and own children under 18), or for new subfamilies (ie. divorced daughters with children who move back into their parents' home), it is easy to identi~family relationships. But for other types of non-nuclear households, containing related or umelated subfamilies, it is much more difficult m identi~welfare-eligible family units, and to track women over time as they become single mothers. For this reason, for example, Hoynes (1995) defines single motherhood as single household headship, except for those women who move out of their parents homes and then back in. This follows most other work on family structure using the PSID. This is clearly a major limitation, since much of the policy interest in AFDC focuses on women who are in subfamilies. Moffitt and Rendall (1993) suggest a means of surmounting this problem for the period 1968-1985 by using the PSID "Relationship File". This file provides pairwise information on the relationships between all members of the PSID sample, using detiled fertili~and marital histories.
This allows one to construct welfare-eligible family units from the raw data, and to follow women over tire" as their family structure changes. The basic strategy suggested by Moffitt and Rendall is m search over all children in the PSID and assign them to a mother, which I do with varying degrees of accuracy; this allows me to state whether women are mothers regardless of whether they are identified family heads or not. I then use the marital history information to assign marital status, completing the measure of single mothership.
Third, consumption in the PSID is measured at the family level, and the event of interest for this study by necessity changes the composition of the family, thereby changing underlying This population all has a similar shock: they are wives who divorce and become family heads.
losing the consumption of a husband. Thus, by restricting to this sample, the constant picks up the effect of composition change, and the AFDC coefficient picks up the consumption smoothing for the 151fchanges in household composition were independent of AFDC benefit levels, then this would bias the estimate of the average change in consumption from single motherhood, but not the marginal impact of AFDC. In fact, however, there is evidence that women move into independent residences as AFDC is more generous (Ellwood and Bane, 1985) . 14 mother and her children.
The sample consists of all 14-64 year old women who become single mothers between one interview and the next. Women can make this transition for one of two reasons: marital dissolution or out-of-wedlock childbearing. 'b They can then bemme either clearly identified family heads or live in unidentified subfamilies; this distinction is important because consumption is measured at the family level, so the effects of AFDC on family consumption will be clearest in the cases where the family consists of the welfare-eligible unit only. 44% of the transitions in my sample are due to marital dissolution, and 56% to childbearing. Almost all of the women who get divorced are clearly identified family heads, while almost all of those who have children out of wedlock live in unidentified subfamilies. The fact that roughly one-half of the women in my sample are not family heads highlights the importance of including sub-families in the analysis, using the Moffitt and Rendall methodology.
An important consideration in selecting my sample, of course, is that becoming a single mother may be a function of the generosity of the welfare system. If the types of women who transition to single motherhood as benefits rise have disproportionately high consumption, it could bias towards a spurious mnsumption smoothing finding. The extent to which this bias exists is a direct function of the effect of welfare generosity on single motherhood. Evidence on this front is mixed, as reviewed by Moffitt (1992) . Early studies found no effect of AFDC on divorce or childbearing probabilities, while more recent cross-sectional analyses have begun to find some effects. But once state fixed effects are included in these models, as they are in the regressions below, any effects of welfare on single motherhood disappear (Moffitt, 1994; Hoynes, 1995) . This 161will refer interchangeably to marital dissolution and divorce. There may be some dissolutions in my sample which are due to the death of the husband, but I do not distinguish these from other types. In my age range there should be relatively few dissolutions due to death. -suggests that there is no potential for sample selection bias in the sample of single mothers. I explicitly test for sample selection below.
Part III: Empirical Stiategy

Reduced Form
I begin by running reduced form regressions in the PSID of the form:
(1) ACW =~+~I M~+~z~+~sz~+~qbj + 857t + @6bj*~END + 6W
where ACi~is the real change in consumption for family i in state j in year t M% is the real maximum AFDC payment level is a set of family-s~ific control variables Z~is a set of state/year-specific mntrol variables j is a full set of f~ed state effects 7, is a full set of fixed time effects TREND is a linear time trend
In this specification, I model the effect of potenfial AFDC benefits (the maximum benefit entitlement) on the consumption change of women who become single mothers (beween periods t-1 and t) and their families. By using consumption changes, I potentially avoid an important limitation of cross-sectional regressions in this context: AFDC benefits may be set as a tinction of the cost of living in included between the state, which is also mrrelated with consumption expenditures. Even with state effects in the regression, changes in prices within a state will induce a spurious positive correlation benefits and consumption levels. But, by differencing out consumption from the previous period, I am able to control for short-run price differences across areas. That is, instead of requiring no correlation between AFDC benefits and price leveh, I impose the weaker assumption that there is no correlation between AFDC benefits and price changes. This most likely surmounts any problems that arise from my inability to control for area-specific food and housing costs.
While this assumption is considerably weaker, there remains the possibility that omitted state/year factors affect both AFDC benefits setting and consumption changes within a state. I therefore pursue two additional steps to ensure that this assumption is warranted, First, in addition to a set of state freed effects, I include a full set of state-specific trends. This will capture any longterm within-state mrrelated shifts in consumption patterns and AFDC benefit generosity, Semnd, I include two state/year mntrol variables that will help to absorb any generaI correlation between AFDC knefit-setting and the nature of consumption opportunities in a state and year: the unemployment rate and the log of personal income per capita.
Despite my use of consumption changes, I use the level of potential AFDC benefits as the key regressor. This is because for this population, their potential AFDC benefits are zero by definition in period t-1.17 So using levels is the same as using changes here, since the lagged level of benefits is mro.
The regression also controls for a set of individual demographic characteristics: race, own age, the age of the family head (who may or may not be the woman, depending on the sample), and the education of the family head. The key regressor is the maximum AFDC benefits for which a family is eligible, based on the state and year, and on the size of the AFDC family unit. I also include dummies for the size of the regression, to ensure that there is not eligible for a larger AFDC benefit. 18 AFDC family unit fid the total PSID family size in the spurious identification from the fact that larger families are Similarly, I include dummies for the change in family size, '71npractice, some of the women in the treatment group will have received AFDC in period t-1, due to the problems of data timing that I have discussed.
18These two mncepts differ only for those in subfamilies. An alternative approach to avoid identification from family size would be to use the benefits for a fixed family sim in each state and year. Using benefits for a family size of three yields a similar coefficient estimate to that reported below, but the stidard error is approximately 50% larger, reflecting the reduced variation in the independent variable. control for the fact that a husband is leaving or a child is added, thus the total consumption needs of the PSID family may change. 19 I also include the change in the family's "food needs", which is a variable construc~d by the PSID to reflect not only family size but the age of family members as well. Fina!ly, I ticlude an indicator for whether this transition to single motherhood was caused by marital dissolution or by childbearing, since there may be quite different changes in underlying food needs from these different events; I separate the analysis into these two subgroups below.m
Benefits Receipt
The regression (1) Blank and Ruggles (1992) estimate that takeup is only about 2/3. Second, not all single heads are eligible for the maximum benefit level; in particular, there is a tax rate on inmme after some deductions that has varied from 66% to 100% over the sample period.
On the other hand, this receipt question cannot be answered by a direct regression of consumption changes on welfare benefits received. As discussed earlier, takeup of welfare is l~at is, I include dummies for each of the following categories: no change in family size; an increase of one person, 2 persons, 3 persons, or 4 or more persons; and a decrease of one person, 2 persons, 3 persons, or 4 or more persons.
'Note that I do not include controls for changes in other family resources, besides AFDC; by the crowdout argument detailed earlier, these are endogenous to the generosity of AFDC. In a specification check below, I do include lagged values of family resources as controls to capture any heterogeneity in ex-ante circumstances correlated with AFDC benefits.
endogenous, leading to a potential sample selection bias to the estimates. Furthermore, there is considerable measurement error in information on AFDC benefits received, both due to the usual reporting problems and the fact that in the PSID the timing of the consumption data is different than the timing of the welfare receipt data. There is a natural instrumental variable for benefits remived, however: the maximum benefit amount. me maximum benefit entitlement is clearly correlated with benefits received, and the working hypothesis of this paper is that maximum benefits is uncorrelated with consumption changes other than through the effects of the welfare system. 
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An important limitation of the 2SN estimate~1, however, is that it might overstate the effect of AFDC on consumption. This is because there may be some option value of the program even for those single heads that don't take up benefits. Suppose that there is some fixed wst to taking up AFDC benef~; a clear example here would be stigma associated with receipt of cash welfare (Moffitt, 1983) . This is consistent with there being less than full takeup among those eligible for the program. Consider a new single mother who would prefer not to take up stigmatizing welfare, but who is unsure of her prospects for finding other sources of income. She may delay takeup while she sorts out her financial situation. But in the meantime she will account for the presence of insurance through AFDC in her consumption choices; that is, she will consume more today than she would if this contingent option were not available, since she knows that she can go on the AFDC program if necessary. In this case,~1will reflect the effect of benefits variation on both recipients and non-recipients, leading to a likely upward bias to the estimate for recipients only. The sign and magnitude of this bias are explored firther in the Appendix.
In theory, this problem could be surmounted if there was a second instrument which could be used to model selection into takeup of AFDC. I was unable to find such an instrument, however.
It is worth noting that this is a general problem with the literature on AFDC and other social insurance programs; analysts either estimate the reduced form or 2SN coefficients, but are unable to measure precisely the option value of these programs on those who do not take them up.
Means
Before exploring the consumption smoothing role of AFDC, it is first usefil to ask: given the existence of AFDC, what are the average consumption implications of becoming a single mother?
Evidence on this question is provided in the first column of For food, the drop is a larger 5.6% fall. But housing expenditures actually rise somewhat, reflecting the fact that some women are moving to new residences; the rate of moving is roughly 50% higher in the sample of women becoming single mothers than for the control group. The overall consumption change for the control group is roughly zero, reflecting a commensurate small decline in food mnsumption and rise in housing consumption.
The means of the remaining PSID covariates are presented in Table 1 as well. Women who become single heads are disproportionately minorities, and they are in families whose heads have low educational attainment. These facts partially reflect the oversampling of disadvantaged households in the PSID; note that even for the control group over 30% are black. 22 The non-zero welfare receipt information for families which do not contain a single mother at periods t or t-1 may reflect some transitions within the year that are not captured by my point in time household status measures, or welfare remived during the calendar year of interview t-1 but before the point of the interview itself (which is sometime in the spring). It may also reflect receipt of other welfare under state general assistan~plans or the AFDC-UP program.
*'Of course this figure is not corrected for scale economies and is therefore somewhat misleading, sin& family composition is changing for the single mothers. This is controlled for in the regressions below. 2~en the sample weights are used to account for this, the key variables AFDC benefits entitlement) are not much changed, but the sample appears much along observable dimensions (for both the treatments and the controls). Table 2 reports the basic reduced form regression results. I present results for food and housing expenditures combined, and then for the two categories separately.
Basic Results
For total food and housing expenditure, on maximum AFDC payments.
For every associated with single motherhood is mitigated there is a simable and significant positive coefficient dollar in po~ntia.1 benefits, the consumption fall by 30 cents. This implies that at the mean potential benefits for the sample, consumption among this population is increased by $1170, relative to the absence of cash welfare benefits. This result is reflected in the next to last row, which shows the implied consumption fall upon single motherhood for the (out of sample) case of a zero maximum potential benefit. In that case, the consumption fall upon single motherhood would be $1353, or more than seven times as large as the consumption fall given our current system (from Table 1 ).
This represents almost 23% of baseline consumption for this population. So this regression shows that the small consumption change that we observe for women becoming single mothers is largely due to the generosity of our current cash welfare system; in the absence of this system the mnsumption fall would be substantial. The remaining coefficients in the regression are uniformly insignificant, except for the change in family consumption needs.
Dividing the dependent variable into food and housing expenditures, we see that AFDC has a positive and (marginally) significant effect in each case. The effect on food is about 50% larger, but the two coefficients are statistically indistinguishable. The results imply that in the absence of AFDC food consumption would fall by roughly 23% of its baseline value when women became single mothers, and housing expenditure would fall by roughly 22%. So, within each category, AFDC is playing an important consumption smoothing role. receipt
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The final row of the Unfortunately, it is difficult to appropriately account for the effects of in-kind programs, since to combine their influence with that of AFDC would require a cash equivalent of their value. For the case of food stamps, however, a number of studies suggest that Food Stamps benefits are roughly equivalent to cash transfers of the same value (ie. Moffitt, 1989) , so that many previous papers on the behavioral effects of the welfare system simply combine food stamp and AFDC entitlements to get the overall effect of both programs. m I do the same in the first panel of Table 3 , taking account of the fact that food stamp benefits are reduced by a fraction of AFDC benefits, after some deductions." As expected, the estimated coefficients are somewhat larger when the combined maximum is used. The reduced form coefficient now implies a 46 cent increase in consumption for 25 The precision of the each dollar of AFDC benefits, and the 2SN coefficient now exceeds one.
estimates has been reduced, however, so that one cannot reject that they are the same as those using the cash welfare maximum alone.
The other two major public assistance programs for single mothers are public housing and health insurance through the Medicaid program. Accounting for the effect of these benefits is much 'Fraker et al. (1995) review a number of studies which suggest that food stamps may be worth somewhat less than a cash equivalent, but even in these cases the value is quite close (72 to 82 cents of cash for each dollar of food stamps). Moreover, if food stamps distort consumption towards food, this would further exacerbate the downward bias to my non-food stamps estimate for food consumption (since food stamps are included in my food consumption measure).
'Specifically, food stamp benefits are reduced by 30 cents for each dollar of income above and beyond a standard deduction and deductions for shelter expenses and child care expenses.
'Note that for -the 2SLS coefficient the dependent variable is non-food stamp consumption, and the independent variable in the second stage is welfare income received plus consumption paid for by food StampS.
harder, since there is little consensus on their cash-equivalent value.zb A further difficulty with public housing, relative to food stamps, is that there is only a limited amount of housing assistance available, so that one must account for the probability that the family actually receives help. Given these problems, I do not attempt to account for the programs in the analysis. Since public housing benefits also "tax" inmme rewived from AFDC, the argument above implies that I would only increase my estimate if I accounted for the program, unless there are state specific differences in public housing programs which are positively correlated with AFDC.27 For Medicaid, the net bias from omitting program changes is hinder to predict. Given the uniformi~of most features of the program, it is unlikely that there is a strong correlation between the AFDC maximum and the value of Medicaid benefits. On the other hand, increases in AFDC benefits, in general, raise the income cutoff for Medicaid eligibility, which would raise the value of the program on average for single women." 2dSee, for example, Smeeding and Moon (1980) , Wolfe and Moffitt (1991) , and Manser (1992) for the case of Medicaid; and Olsen and Barton (1983), Reeder (1985) , and Schwab (1985) for the case of public housing. One methodology used in some studies of Medicaid is to add average state/year Medicaid expenditures per recipient to the food stamp plus AFDC benefit to get a combined benefit total. But, given the uniformity of the Medicaid benefit structure across states, average state/year expenditures largely reflect d inferences in population characteristics and price differences, not insurance value. 27AIs0 the housing expenditure variable does not include the value of public housing. So if subsidies~istort consumption towards housing, this will lead to an offsetting bias against finding consumption smoothing if I exclude potential public housing benefits (since increases in AFDC lower public housing benefits, raising expenditure on non-public housing).
*aAnother important consideration with Medicaid is that, begiming in the mid-1980s, the link between AFDC and Medicaid was severed by a series of expansions of the Medicaid program to traditional family structures and higher income levels (Currie and Gruber, 1996a, b) . This could confound the analysis, if Medicaid were available both before and after the transition to single motherhood. However, these expansions had not started by the time that my PSID sample ends in 1985.
-
Specification~ecb
The empirical results presented in Tables 2 are predicated on a key identification assumption: that the underlying consumption tastes or needs of women who become single mothers in places with more or less generous AFDC benefits are the same. In this section, I provide a number of tests to assess the validity of this assumption.
One means of assessing the identification assumption is to control further for potential underlying differences in the population of single mothers. I do so in the first row of Table 4 by including a set of lagged earnings of family head, individual and family characteristics: lagged values for family income, the the earnings of the woman (who may in some cases have been labelled by the PSID the family head), and her hours of work. As the second panel of Table 3 shows, including these extra controls has little effect on the results.
An alternative reason why AFDC may be spuriously correlated with consumption changes is that I have not fully conditioned out the underlying correlation between AFDC benefits setting and changes in consumption opportunities.
I can assess the validity of this criticism by rerunning the regression for a within-stafe cowrol group: those who remain married or who remain unmarried nonheads from interview t-1 to t. For these populations, there should be little effect of AFDC on mnsumption changes. 29 But if there is a spurious correlation between AFDC benefits setting and consumption opportunities, it should be reflected in the consumption of women who don 't become 2~ere may be effects through long run behavior of those women who perceive some risk of relying on AFDC. For example, as noted in the model above, these women may save less on their own if AFDC is more generous, leading to faster consumption growth rates for the family. There may also be effects on their labor supply and job choice. But all of these effects should be quite small for the average married couple, given the low odds that a given married woman will end up on AFDC. There also may be some small positive effects because some of these women may have been single heads during the year (as illustrated by the non-zero welfwe income for this control group). Finally, one reason why the identi~ing resumption may be violated is sample section bias arising from women becoming single mothers in response to changes in AFDC generosity. Sample selection bias to me estimates would require both that AFDC induce more women to become single mothers, and that those women who are induced by AFDC have different underlying consumption needs or tastes tha are not captured by my set of controls. However, the first of these requirements is refuted by the previous literature on AFDC which finds that, once state effects are included in the regression, there is no effect of welfare on single motherhood (Hoynes, 1995; Moffitt, 1994) .
To make this point more clearly for my sample, Ire-estimate models of the effect of AFDC on the transition to single motherhood. That is, I estimate regressions of the form of (1), but where the dependent variable is now a dummy for becoming a single mother, and the sample is both women who do and do not become" single mothers, There are two regressions: one for transitioning to single motherhood through marital dissolution (from married mother to single mother); and one for transitioning to single motherhood through childbearing (from unmarried childless woman to single mother) .30 30For these regressions, I exclude the controls for family size and food needs (but retain controls for sim of the welfare unit), since these are clearly endogenous to whether the transition to single motherhood is made. I also control only for the woman's age, and not for the head's age as well, since the difference between these ages will be a function of whether the woman is a single mother (since single mothers are often heads). The coefficient estimate of interest is not sensitive to either of these changes in the regression specification.
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The results of these probit regressions are shown in Table 4 . For both~pes of transitions, the -fticient on AFDC benefits is insignificant, which is consistent with previous work; for transition through child-bearing, the -fficient is even wrong-signed. The third row from the bottom of each mlurnn is the implied marginal probability of a $1000 increase in AFDC benefits on the likelihood of being a single mother. Even in the first w1umn, where the coefficient is positive, the implied effect of this large benefits increase is only 3% of the mean likelihood of having a transition. Moreover, taking a weighted average of these two coefficients for the full sample of single mothers, the estimated effect is negative. The implication is that these data support the mntention from other studies that AFDC is not an important determinant of single motherhood in models that include state effects. Table 5 extends the tialysis by further dividing the food and housing consumption measures.
tienswn:~pes of Onswnption
I first divide the food consumption variable into food consumed at home and food consumed away from home. To the extent that AFDC generosity increases have their expenditure effects by simply inducing a shifi from restaurant to home mnsumption, it suggests that expenditure changes may overstate changes in nutritioml value, which might be the underlying measure of most interest from a social welfare perspective. In this case, we would expect that increases in AFDC generosity are reflected 'mostly in food consumed away from home; in fact, it is possible that the coefficient on food at home could be negative. But we observe the reverse in Table 5 : there is no effect of AFDC on food away from home, and a large effect on food at. home. While this doesn't allow one to definitively convert these estimates to nutritional values, it does reduce the concern over the result being driven by a shift in the site at which food is consumed.
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Inextdivide tiehousing expendimre vmiable into renmlmd motigage expendimres. Rental expenditures have the advantage that they may more appropriately reflect the service flow from the house, particularly if women are living in houses where much of the mortgage has been paid down.
In fact, while the estimates are not very precise, most of the housing expenditure effect appears to be arising through changes in rental expenditures. This suggests that women are truly improving the quality of their living si~ation as AFDC benefits rise.
The final row extends the analysis of housing expenditures by assessing whether AFDC generosity affects the likelihood of moving when one becomes a single mother. The coefficient is from a probit regression, and the implied marginal probability is presented in the second column.31
There is a positive coefficient on AFDC benefits which is marginally significant. It implies that each $1000 of AFDC benefits raises the likelihood of moving by 4.3 percentage points. This is roughly a 12% rise in the likelihood of moving for women who become single mothers. Taken further confirms that one role played by AFDC which is mnsistent with the conclusion tiension: Sub-Population
In Table 6 , I explore is to allow single mothers to improve their living situations, of E1lwood and Bane (1985) .
how this result varies across the different types of transitions to single motherhood. I begin by dividing the sample into those who become single mothers through marital dissolution, and those who become single mothers through child-bearing. The overall effect on food and housing is approximately twice as large for in consumption at zero AFDC benefits is quite the former group. For this group, the implied fall large ($1925 dollars), and represen~s 34% of this 31The set of controls in the regression is limited in the same manner as for the selection probits described earlier.
group's baseline pre-dissolution consumption. For those who have unmarried births, the reduced form effect is smaller and is not significant, although the standard error is large.
Dividing mnsumption into its components, it appears that most of the effect of AFDC on the marital dissolution sample is coming through housing expenditures, not through food. In fact, for food the estimated effect is larger for the unmarried births sample; but for this sample there is no effect whatsoever on housing expenditures.
In the next row of the Table, I reduce the sample further to those who had marital dissolution and are now family heads, This removes noise in the consumption data by allowing me to measure wnsumption for the AFDC-eligible unit only. And, m discussed earlier, this allows for a more precise control for composition change by using a sample that is undergoing a common transition.
In fact, for this sample the effects are all somewhat stronger than in the first row: the implied fall at zero benefits is 44% of the baseline consumption before dissolution for this population. The difference between the first and third rows arises from a stronger food expenditure effect for those who are now family heads; for this population, both components of consumption rise significantly.
Thus, to summarize, it appears that the effect of AFDC is stronger for those who become single heads through marital dissolution, and this is primarily because there is an effect on housing consumption which is not present for those who enter this state through child-bearing.
In both groups, however, there is a sizeable effect on food expenditure changes.
This finding for housing expenditures is striking and bears on an important normative question that is raised by the analysis. A number of critics of the AFDC program have suggested that the fact that single mothers may use their benefits to move out of the family home and set up their own residence is a cost, not a benefit, of the program. This is because, for example, it may rob the new child of a stable home atmosphere that can serve as a role model. I have ignored this point in the analysis thus far, considering the woman argument implies that the social welfare maximum may Presumably, however, this argument applies as optimizing over her opportunity set; this involve constraining the woman's choice set.
more strongly to single women who have children, as opposed to women who are divorced and may need to find a new place to live. But the evidence presented here suggests that it is only for divorced women that AFDC generosity affects spending on housing. 32 This suggests that there is less need for concern over the potentially pernicious effects of AFDC generosity in encouraging young never married women to set up their own residences.
Fidly, as noted earlier, an alternative means of dealing with the fact that family composition is changing is to hold the composition of the family constant. That is, I can redefine the "family"
to include all former members of the family in which the woman resided in period t-1. By adding together the period t consumption of all individuals who resided together at t-1, I avoid potential biases arising from my focus just on those who reside with the woman in period t.
Of the 1320 women who become single mothers in these data, (317) there is data on the consumption change of other families who in roughly 1/4 of the cases resided with the women in period t-l. In the next to last row of Table 6 , I show the basic results for the treatment families only for this subsample. The results are slightly stronger than the full sample findings from Table 2 , but they are the total similar to the results for heads, and most of this sample is heads. In the next row, I use consumption in period t for all families that splitoff from the woman's household in period 321ndeed when I rerun the moving equations from Table 5 separately for marital dissolution and for single c~ildbearing," I find that the effect is much stronger for the marital dissolution sample, which is consistent with the housing expenditure results; however, the estimate is insignificant for this group, t-1. The coefficient estimates are almost identical, although the standard errors are somewhat higher, making precise inferences difficult. Interestingly, the mean consumption change is much smaller overall when we add in the consumption of splitoffs, and is wrong signed for the two components .33
The wrong signed components presumably reflect the fact that economies of scale considerations dictate larger spending on average when households split than when they are together.
Part V: Conclusions
The current system of providing cash welfare to single mothers and their children is likely to be a mntentious source of debate for the foreseeable future. Despite a lack of strong evidence of disincentive effects, the intuitive case that more generous AFDC should lead to lower levels of labor supply and family dissolution provides strong motivation for reform of the system. me point of this paper is to provide some evidence of the benefits of this program that can be weighed in the reform calculus.
My findings suggest that AFDC plays an important role in smoothing the wnsumption of women who become single mothers. Clearly, consumption expenditures is only one proxy for well being, and there are other measures that should be considered in future work on this topic. But these best available proxies from the PSID suggest that reducing this safety net will lead to a serious reduction in the standard of living of women who bemme single mothers and their families, An important caveat to this exercise, however, is that I have only considered variations within the existing structure of the cash welfare system. If this system were abolished altogether, or changed in some other dramatic fashion (such as through time limits or binding "work for welfare" 33Note that the predictions for the components need not add to the prediction for the total of consumption, if the control variables have very different effects on food and housing expenditure. requirements), it could cause a shift in the nature of private insurance mitigate the mnsumption smoothing costs of reduced welfare generosity.
mechanisms which would
As states experiment with such radical changes to their welfare systems, it would behoove administrators to collect information not only on labor supply and family structure but on measures of material well being which can be used to evaluate the insurance impacts of changkg the structure of the welfare system. -
Appendix -Option Value and Bias to 2SLS Estimate
In this appendix I explore the potential bias to the 2SU estimate of the consumption smoothing impact of AFDC arising from an option value effect. I do so within the framework of a simple two observation example, which allows me to compute the 2SU estimate as a Wald estimator, or a ratio of the reduced form and first stage effects (Angrist, 1991) .
In this simplified example, consumption is modelled by:
where C is wnsumption K is a constant + /9*(1-a)*x*PB is the true consumption effect of AFDC receipt (the interest) a is the fraction of single mothers receiving AFDC PB is potential benefits x is the option value (O< x < 1) structural parameter of
The fust term is some constant which is independent of the AFDC system. The second is the effect of AFDC on recipients, and the third is the effect on non-recipients, which is non-zero only if there is some option value. Where ti/6PB is the marginal takeup effect of increases in potential benefits (the increase beyond the automatic rise in benefits received at a given level of takeup). We can compute the 2SLS coefficient of interest as 6C/6PB / dBEN/6PB, where BEN is benefits received. BEN is determined according to:
(3) BEN = a*PB, so that (4) 6BEN/dPB = 6cr/dPB*PB + a Combining these equations, we obtain a 2SLS coefficient of (5)~' = @ * JOa/OPB*F!B*(l-x) + a + (1-a)xl da/6PB*PB + a
The second term is the bias to our parameter of interest,~. The sign is indeterminate. If x = O,~' =6; there is no bias if there is no option value, and the 2SN estimate is appropriate. If X > 0, and 6a/6PB = O (no marginal takeup effect), then the bias is clearly upwards. If Oa/6PB > 0 as well, however, the bias is indeterminate, although it will still be upwards except when 6a/6PB is very large. Regressions also control for fixd effects for AFDC unit size, family size, change in family size, state and year, and for state-specific time trends. 2SLS estimate is from 'a separate &timation of tbe system of equations (2) in the text. Standard errors in parentheses. Regressions also control for fixed effects for AFDC unit size, family s~, change in family size, state and year, and for state-specific time trends. 2SLS estimate is from a separate intimation of the system of 'equations (2) in the text. Not~: Standard errors in pwenthaes.
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Regressions also wntrol for fixed effects for AFDC unit size, state and year, and for state-specific time trends. Effect of $1000 AFDC Benefit Increase is change in implied marginal probability from raising AFDC benefits by $1000, averaged across the relevant sample. Regressions also control for fixed effects for AFDC unit size, family size, change in family size, state and year, and for state-specific time trends (except for final row, as described in text). Second mlurnn of contains implied effects at zero AFDC benefits or implied marginal probability from probit regression. Standard errors in parentheses. Regressions also control for fixed effects for AFDC unit size, family size, change in family size, state and year, and for state-specific time trends. Second column of each panel contains implied effects at zero AFDC benefits.
